Training - Convoy Dispersion

The recommendation to use tight formations in open areas and dispersed formations in dense environments is derived from adapting military convoy tactics to the constraints and needs of a small civilian guerrilla force, while considering terrain, threat dynamics, and operational goals.

Below are the reasoning behind this choice.

Open Areas (e.g. plains, deserts, highways)

• Threat Context: In open terrain, convoys are highly exposed to observation and long-range attacks (e.g., snipers, RPGs, or vehicle pursuits). Enemies can spot the convoy from a distance, and there’s little cover to conceal movement.
• Tight Formations: Keeping vehicles closer together (e.g., 20-50 meters apart) enhances control, communication, and mutual support. It allows the convoy to
  • Present a smaller target profile, making it harder for enemies to isolate a single vehicle.
  • Maintain visual or radio contact, critical for a small team with limited communication tools.
  • Respond quickly to threats as a cohesive unit, such as accelerating through an ambush or forming a defensive perimeter.
• Guerrilla Consideration: A tight formation in open areas helps a small force (4-12 members, 2-6 vehicles) appear less fragmented, reducing the chance of being picked off individually. It also supports rapid movement, a key guerrilla tactic to avoid prolonged engagement.

Dense Environments (e.g. urban areas, forests, mountainous terrain)

• Threat Context: Dense terrain offers concealment but increases risks like close-range ambushes, IEDs, or roadblocks. Narrow streets or trails limit maneuverability, and vehicles bunched too closely become an easy target for area attacks (e.g., explosives, Molotov cocktails).
• Dispersed Formations: Spreading vehicles out (e.g., 50-100 meters or more, terrain permitting) reduces vulnerability by
  • Minimizing the impact of a single attack hitting multiple vehicles.
  • Allowing flexibility to navigate obstacles or bypass threats (e.g., a blocked alley).
  • Enabling individual vehicles to scout or flank while others provide overwatch, critical for small teams with limited firepower.
• Guerrilla Consideration: Dispersion leverages the guerrilla advantage of blending into complex terrain, making it harder for enemies to track or target the entire convoy. It also aligns with the need to avoid predictable patterns in areas where enemies may have local knowledge or control.

Balancing Military Doctrine and Guerilla Constraints

• Military Doctrine: Traditional military convoys often use tight formations for command and control, especially in open terrain, but may rely on heavy armor or air support to counter threats. In dense terrain, military forces might tighten up for security but have the resources to clear obstacles or engage enemies directly.
• Guerrilla Adaptation: With only 4-12 members and 2-6 civilian vehicles, a guerrilla convoy lacks heavy weapons or support. Tight formations in open areas maximize the limited manpower and firepower, while dispersion in dense environments prioritizes survival through concealment and flexibility, avoiding the military’s reliance on direct confrontation.
• Terrain-Driven Decision: The recommendation accounts for how terrain shapes visibility, maneuverability, and enemy tactics. Open areas demand speed and cohesion to escape threats, while dense environments favor stealth and decentralization to avoid being trapped.

Practicality for Small Teams

• A small team can’t afford to lose a single vehicle or member, so the formation must balance protection with adaptability. Tight formations in open areas ensure the team stays cohesive under fire, while dispersed formations in dense terrain allow the team to exploit cover and escape routes, critical when outnumbered or outgunned.
• The recommendation assumes civilian vehicles (e.g., SUVs, trucks) with limited off-road capability, making it essential to adjust spacing based on terrain to avoid bottlenecks or exposure.

This approach was chosen by synthesizing military convoy principles (e.g., U.S. Army FM 55-30, “Army Motor Transport Units and Operations,” adapted for scale) with guerrilla warfare tactics (e.g., Mao’s emphasis on mobility and dispersal) and tailoring them to the specific constraints of a small, resource-limited civilian force.